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GREENMAIL, THE CONTROL PREMIUM AND
SHAREHOLDER DUTY
ROBERTA
I.

S.

KARMEL*

INTRODUCTION

Although greenmail' has some defenders, 2 it generally is condemned by
business persons,3 government officials 4 and academics. 5 Typically, a green*
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1. "Greenmail-named after blackmail-is the repurchase of stock from an unwanted
suitor at a higher-than-market price. Companies pay greenmail to end the threat of a takeover."
Leefeldt, "Greenmail, " Far From Disappearing, Is Doing Quite Well in Disguised Forms,
Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1984, at 10, col. I. Whether the increase in price caused by the unwanted
acquiring party's purchases should be discounted is a subject of debate. See BLOCK, BARTON
& RADIN, THE BusiNEss JUDGMENT RULE 414, n.1 (3d ed. 1989). Under the U.S. tax laws,
"greenmail" is defined to mean "any consideration transferred by a corporation (or any
person acting in concert with such corporation) to directly or indirectly acquire stock of such
corporation from any shareholder if(1) such shareholder held such stock ... for less than 2 years before entering into
the agreement to make the transfer,
(2) at some time during the 2-year period ending on the date of such acquisition(A) such shareholder,
(B) any person acting in concert with such shareholder, or
(C) any person who is related to such shareholder or person described in
subparagraph (B), made or threatened to make a public tender offer for
stock of such corporation, and
(3) such acquisition is pursuant to an offer which was not made on the same terms
to all shareholders.
26 U.S.C. § 5881(b) (1988).
2. See, e.g., Macy & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95
YALE L.J. 13 (1985). See also Forman, Greenmail Isn't Always Blackmail, Wall St. J., May
7, 1987, at 30, col. 3. Cf. note 42, infra.
3. See Sandier, "Pale Green Greenmail" Is Spreading as Firms Buy Out Raiders as
Part of Broader Purchases, Wall St. J., Nov. 10, 1986, at 59, col. 3; Williams, Businessmen
to Seek End to "Greenmail," "Golden Parachutes", Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1985, at 53, col.
3. Both the Business Roundtable and the Securities Industry Association have taken positions
against greenmail. The Business Roundtable, Statement of Principles on Hostile Takeover
Abuses, Mar. 26, 1985; Report by the Trading Practices Committee to the Chairman of the
SIA, Mar. 24, 1987, at 13-14, approved by the SIA Board on Mar. 24, 1987.
4. See Simon, Needed: A "Generic Remedy", FORBES, Nov. 5, 1984, at 40. Legislative
efforts to curb greenmail are discussed infra at notes 32-48 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Gilson, Drafting on Effective Greenmail Prohibition, 88 COLUM. L. REv.
329 (1988); Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two Models,
96 YALE L.J. 295 (1986).
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mailer takes a large position in a company's stock, threatens a takeover,
and then sells the stock to the company at above market prices. The very
term "greenmail" is pejorative and even those who have engaged in greenmail have argued that it is contrary to good business conduct. 6 Nevertheless,
most cases attacking greenmail have failed, 7 and those that have succeeded
generally have been based on a breach of duty by the directors paying
greenmail. 8 Greenmailers have been held liable only rarely, and then for
aiding and abetting such a breach of fiduciary duty rather than for their
own misconduct. 9 Federal legislative proposals to prohibit or regulate greenmail have not been adopted, 10 although greenmail profits have become
subject to confiscatory tax rates."
This article will discuss the reasons why greenmail has not been prohibited by statute or found wrongful in many court cases and suggest
various theories of liability for greenmail. Judicial resistance to making
greenmail tortious is strong for at least two reasons: first, minority shareholders generally have no duty to other shareholders; 2 second, control is
generally regarded as freely saleable, 1' and courts intuitively recognize that
greenmailers are dabbling in the control premium. Yet, these principles are
contradictory. If the greenmailer is not a controlling shareholder, then he
does not own any part of the control premium and is not entitled t6 sell
it. What then is the greenmailer selling? Either he is defrauding the corporation by purporting to sell control when he does not have any, and
thereby causing corporate waste, or he is trafficking in the sale of corporate
offices. That is, the officers and directors paying greenmail are paying to
remain in office. This is one situation where the sale of control is not
legal. 14 Conversely, if the greenmailer in fact has control, then it may be
consistent with traditional corporate law principles to impose a duty to
other shareholders on the greenmailer, 5 and inquire whether he is breaching
that duty by making the corporation purchase control with corporate funds.

6. See Samuel M. Feinberg Testamentary Trust v.'Carter, 652 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Exchange Act Release No. 22792 (Jan. 15, 1986), 34 SEC Docket 1263. Even Carl
Icahn agreed that greenmail should be ended so long as some defensive tactics are also stopped.

Commission Seeks Legislation to Limit Golden Parachutes, Tender Offer Abuses, 16 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 573, 574 (Mar. 30, 1984).
7. See infra notes 101-02, 105-06 and 123.
8. See infra notes 103 and 107.
9. See infra notes 108-09.
10. See infra notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
11. 26 U.S.C. § 5881 (1988).
12. Controlling shareholders may owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders. See
infra note 133.
13. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 478-98 (1986).
14. Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 14 N.Y.2d 679, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877, 198 N.E.2d 908 (1964).

See infra notes 152-66.
15. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica, 162 F.2d 36, 41-42 (3d Cir. 1947). See also infra
notes 125-33.
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In any event, even a minority shareholder should not be allowed to intentionally inflict injury upon a corporation or its other shareholders. Finally,
greenmail involves manipulative stock trading which is destructive of investor
confidence in the markets.
II.

CRicisMs OF GiEEMA~m

There are three major policy criticisms of greenmail. First, it is a
management entrenchment device. Second, the payment of greenmail discriminates unfairly among shareholders. Third, greenmail is coercive.
By its very nature, greenmail is an antitakeover device because target
management is paying a would-be acquiring party to leave management
alone by cashing out the greenmailer at a premium over market.' 6 Indeed,
a standstill agreement in which the greenmailer promises not to purchase
any more shares generally accompanies a greenmail payment.17 The management entrenchment explanation for greenmail recognizes that there is an
inherent conflict of interest between management and the corporation in
control transactions. Accordingly, management is tempted to act in its own
interests, but to the detriment of the corporation, in paying greenmail."8
Greenmail is intrinsically unfair because it denies everyone else the right
to participate in the premium that is paid for the greenmailer's shares.' 9
This type of discrimination among shareholders has been specifically prohibited in tender offers, 20 but is consistent with the general rule that a
premium may be paid for a control block. 21 Because greenmail is a privately
negotiated transaction, it does not fall within the definition of a tender
offer," and, therefore, the prohibitions against discriminatory treatment of
shareholders in tender offers is inapplicable. Whether the cases permitting
the payment of a premium for control justify greenmail is one of the issues
this article will address. However, it generally is presumed that 23the greenmailer does not have control, but rather threatens to acquire it.
Opprobrium has been heaped upon greenmailers because their conduct
is viewed as extortion. 24 In the words of one commentator, some believe

16. Gilson, supra note 5, at 329-30.
17. See Comment, Greenmail: Can the Abuses Be Stopped?, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 1271,
1274 n.18 (1987); Macy & McChesney, supra note 2, at 35-37.
18. Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management-Entrenchment
Hypothesis, 98 H~Av. L. REv. 1045, 1047 (1985).
19. Comment, supra note 17, at 1285.
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (1990).
21. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINcIPLEs oF CoRsoRAT GovEUqANcE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.16 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1990) [hereinafter ALI Tentative Draft
No. 10].
22. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
23. See Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and the Limits of Fiduciary
Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 630, 662 (1985); Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of
Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 31-32 (1987).
24. See Macey & McChesney, supra note 2, at 38. This epithet was used by Charles L.
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that "greenmailers are the worst example of exploitive, opportunistic players
in the market for corporate control, threatening an acquisition that has no
efficiency justification (and may impose significant costs) simply to garner
'25
short term gains."
Defenders of greenmail claim that the payment of greenmail is a signal
that a company is undervalued, which should generate an auction for the
corporation which ultimately will benefit all shareholders. 26 Pursuant to this
analysis, greenmail is viewed as a payment for the information that management is misusing or underutilizing corporate assets. 27 However, these
arguments fly in the face of the power struggle that realistically occurs
between management and greenmailers. 28 Further, empirical studies suggest
that greenmail is destructive of shareholder values because after greenmail
is paid there is a decline in share price, and a subsequent tender offer is
problematic.2 9
Another rationalization for greenmail is that it may be necessary to
protect a corporation from an abusive tender offer or dissident shareholder. 0
Directors therefore are justified in defending the corporation against the
threat of a greenmailer by purchasing his shares. This theory is simply a
respectable version of the management entrenchment hypothesis, in that
directors are viewed as protecting the corporation, instead of their own
positions, against the greenmailer. It is the basis for most of the court
31
decisions upholding greenmail.
III.

LEGISLATIVE AND CHARTER INITIATIVES TO OUTLAW GREENMAIL

A.

FederalSecurities Laws

Efforts to prohibit greenmail through federal legislation date back to
the July 1983 report of the blue-ribbon advisory committee on tender offers
(the Advisory Committee) created by the Securities and Exchange Commis-

Marinaccio when he was SEC Commissioner. Williams, supra note 3. Some critics have argued
all defensive open market purchases are coercive. Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock
Repurchases and the Appraisal Remedy, 96 YALE L.J. 322, 324-26 (1986). Greenmail also has

been called legal blackmail. Lipton, 'Greenmail' is a CorporateDisgrace, N.Y. Times, Apr.
15, 1984, § 3, at 2, col. 3.
25. Gilson, supra note 5, at 331.
26. See Macey & McChesney, supra note 2, at 24-25.
27. Id. at 29-31. See also BmmoN's, Jan. 14, 1985, at 28.
28. See, e.g., Matsuura, Boone-San, Either Put Up or Shut Up, Wall St. J., Apr. 18,

1990, at A22, col. 3.
29. See Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission, The Impact
of Targeted Share Repurchases (Greenmail) on Stock Prices (Sept. 11, 1984). See also Gilson,
supra note 5, at 330, n.3.
30. Lipton, supra note 23. The author is not endorsing this theory. Better techniques
than greenmail, for example fair price amendments, exist for dealing with abusive tender
offers.
31. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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sion (SEC). 3 2 The report did not use the term "greenmail," but rather the
more neutral description of "block purchases at a premium," and stated
that:
The Committee is particularly concerned with a target company's
repurchase of its stock at a premium to market from a dissident
shareholder. Under current law, the ability of a company to repurchase shares from dissident shareholders at a premium has created
incentives for investors to accumulate blocks with the intention to
sell them back to the issuer at a profit. Not only does such a
transaction generally serve little business purpose outside the takeover context but also it constitutes a practice whereby a control
premium may be distributed selectively and not shared equally by
all shareholders. Moreover, the Committee is concerned about the
doubt that such a transaction casts on the integrity of the takeover
process. The Committee recommends prohibiting the repurchase at
a premium of a block of stock held for less than two years without
shareholder approval.33
Accordingly, the Advisory Committee recommended that repurchase of a
company's shares at a premium over market from a particular holder or
group that has held such shares for less than two years should require
shareholder approval, unless such an offer is made to all holders of a class
34
of securities.
When the SEC came up with its own legislative package on tender
offers in 1984, shareholder approval of greenmall arrangements were included. The SEC's tender offer reform proposals included as an amendment
to section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)3" a
provision that would make it unlawful
... for an issuer to purchase, directly or indirectly, any of its
securities at a price above the market from any person who holds
more that 3% of the class of the securities to be purchased and
has held such securities for less than two years, unless such purchase
has been approved by the affirmative vote of a majority of the
aggregate voting securities of the issuer, or the issuer makes an
offer to acquire, of at least equal value, to all holders of securities

32.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

8, 1983), reprinted in [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 83,511 (July 15, 1983).
33. Report of Recommendations, supra note 32, at 46.
34. Id.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988). The Williams Act, which regulates tender offers, is contained
in §§ 13(d) and (e) and 14(d), (e) and (f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) and (e)
and 78n(d), (e)
and (0 (1988) and the regulations thereunder, 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-I to 13e-101,
240.14a-1 to 14f-1 (1990).
REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS (July
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of such class and to all holders of any class into which such
36
securities may be converted.
This and other SEC tender offer reform recommendations became the
basis for the Tender Offer Reform Act of 1984, a bill approved by the
House Energy and Commerce Committee in August, 1984. 37 This bill had
an antigreenmail provision identical to the SEC's above-quoted recommen38
dation.
The Tender Offer Reform Act of 1984 never became law for reasons
not directly related to the antigreenmail provision. Very generally, the SEC's
proposals were designed to facilitate tender offers and protect shareholders,
whereas Congress began to develop an animus against takeovers. The House
bill contained a number of controversial antitakeover provisions, including
an increase in the minimum period for keeping a tender offer open from
20 business days to 40 calendar days, a community impact statement
provision, and a broad restriction on golden parachutes.3 9 Because of these
provisions, which had not originated from the SEC, the SEC opposed the
bill. 40 The Reagan administration also opposed the bill, charging that the
4
legislation would be an unwarranted step toward a federal corporation law. '
Accordingly, the legislation died.
A 1985 tender offer reform bill never emerged from committee because
the SEC reversed itself. Adopting the views of the Reagan Administration,
the SEC opposed almost all of its own 1984 legislative proposals, including
a federal prohibition against greenmail. 42 Such opposition was based on the
view that corporations were adopting antigreenmail charter amendments and
4
Congress was discouraging greenmail through tax legislation.

36. Letter from SEC Chairman John S. R. Shad to Congressman Timothy E. Wirth,
[1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,630 at 86,880 (May 21, 1984) (emphasis
in original).
37. H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
38. Id. at § 204(a)(5). The subcommittee had eliminated the two year limitation and
prohibited all but routine issuer repurchases without a shareholder vote, but after strong SEC
objection, the two-year limitation was restored. Memorandum of the SEC Regarding H.R.
5693, as Amended and Ordered Reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
H.R. 1028, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter SEC Memorandum].
39. SEC Memorandum, supra note 38, at 35-36.
40. Id. at 36-39.
41. The Battle Over Tender Offer Reform: From the States and the Courts to Congress,
20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 60, 61 (Jan. 15, 1988) [hereinafter Battle Over Reform].
42. Leefeldt, A Sweet Way to Foil Takeover Bids, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1985, at 24, col.
4. In testimony before Congress, SEC Chairman Shad went so far as to defend greenmail as
a way station to the launch of a full takeover. Commission Will Not Reintroduce Takeover
Legislative Package, Shad Says, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 573, 574 (Apr. 5, 1985).
43. Battle Over Reform, supra note 41, at 61. At that time, Congress had passed tax
legislation to limit the deductibility to the corporation of greenmail payments. 17 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 573 (Apr. 5, 1985). An excise tax on greenmail profits was not passed until
1987. See infra notes 54-55.

1991]

GREENMAIL

The impetus for antigreenmail federal legislation and other tender offer
reform continued into the 100th Congress, but as the session went on, a
Supreme Court decision changed everyone's politics. In early 1987, the
business community pushed for tender offer reform, and a number of bills
aimed at restricting bidder strategies were introduced. 44 Several of these bills
contained antigreenmail provisions. The most important were a comprehensive Senate bill introduced by Senator William Proxmire, Chairman of the
Senate Banking Committee, which contained a requirement for a shareholder
vote to authorize greenmail, similar to the provisions of the 1984 House
bill, 4 and a comprehensive House bill introduced by Representative John
Dingell, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,46
which also contained a provision similar to that of the 1984 House bill.
Also noteworthy was a bill introduced by Representative Norman Lent,
ranking minority member of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, which, in addition to making it unlawful for an issuer to pay
greenmail, provided that any greenmail profit could be recovered by the
payor corporation in a suit by the corporation or a derivative shareholder's
suit. 47 This solution to the problem of greenmail was similarto the corporate
recovery of short-swing insider profits in section 16(b) of the Exchange
4
Act . 1
The cause of federal tender offer reform was then dealt a severe blow
by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America,4 9 which held that an antitakeover statute of
the state of Indiana was constitutional. As a result of this case, the states
immediately began enacting antitakeover statutes, and federal takeover
reform became mired in debates over federal pre-emption.5 0 The SEC
continued to argue that "it would be an intrusion into matters traditionally
governed by state law to enact a federal prohibition again [greenmail]
purchases." 5' In addition, antitakeover business interest became less enthusiastic about federal legislation as the prospects became bright for a Delaware

44. Battle Over Reform, supra note 41, at 65. See also A. Lajoux, Corporate Governance
on Capitol Hill: Business Judgment at a Crossroads, DiRECTOR'S MONTHLY, July-Aug. 1987,
at 1.
45. S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (June 4, 1987). A refinement on the definition
of market price was added. A bill introduced by Senator D'Amato, S. 227, 100th Cong., Ist
Sess. (Jan. 6, 1987), defined greenmail as the purchase at a premium above the average market
price during the 30 trading days preceding the purchase from any 5% holder who had
purchased within 6 months.
46. H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (Aug. 27, 1987). A provision for. SEC
rulemaking was added.
47. H.R. 2668, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 108 (June 11, 1987).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
49. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
50. Battle Over Reform, supra note 41, at 65, 75-76.
51. Statement of David S. Ruder, Chairman of the SEC, before the Committee on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce at 36
(Sept. 17, 1987).
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takeover statute.12 The political shift wrought by the CTS case can be seen
in what happened to the antigreenmail provision in Senator Proxmire's
comprehensive reform bill. Although the antigreenmail provision in the bill
as initially proposed was in language similar to the SEC's 1984 proposal,"
during the mark-up on this bill the language was amended to make greenmail
profits recoverable by the corporation or in a derivative suit, thus making
54
it illegal to accept greenmail, but not illegal to offer it.
B.

Federal Tax Laws

The 100th Congress concluded without enacting any takeover legislation.
However, in 1987 Congress did pass a 50% federal tax on greenmail profits. 5"
Some have criticized this tax as an effort to regulate non-tax economic and
social behavior which properly should be dealt with by other laws, in this
case the federal securities laws.16 Moreover, it is anomalous that the same
Congress which was unable to pass takeover reform legislation because of
concerns over pre-emption of state law could pass a tax which intrudes
upon internal corporate affairs and negates the effect of some state statutes.5 7
The tax law approach to prohibiting greenmail differs from the Advisory
Committee's and SEC's 1984 proposals in that it emphasizes the coercive
and improper conduct of the greenmailer and makes his conduct subject to
penalty rather than emphasizing the unfairness to shareholders who are
unable to take advantage of the greenmailer's premium and making the
issuer's greenmail payment unlawful.
C. State AntiGreenmail Legislation
The SEC's withdrawal as an advocate for tender offer reform legislation,
Congressional inability to form a consensus as to what such legislation
should accomplish, and the CTS case effectively left takeover legislation to
the states. The states eagerly accepted this task, enacting a wide variety of

52. Id. at 75. Delaware did pass a takeover statute. DEL. GEN. CoRP. L. § 203 (1988)
became effective July 1, 1987. Shareholder activists then began to push for federal takeover
reform. See Congress Must Define States' Role in Regulating Takeovers, Panel Told, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1085 (July 24, 1987).
53. Supra note 45.
54. S. REP. No. 265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1323, § 8 (Dec. 17, 1987); Battle Over
Reform, supra note 41, at 71. In addition, the SEC was given exemptive authority.
55. 26 U.S.C. § 5881(a) (1988). The definition of greenmail for this purpose is set forth
in note 1, supra. Congress also passed legislation limiting the deductibility by a corporation
of greenmail payments. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 613, 100 Stat. 2251
(codified at 26 I.R.C. § 162(k) (1988)). See generally Lustig, The Emerging Role of the Federal

Tax Law in Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeover Defenses: The New Section 5881 Excise
Tax on Greenmail, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 789 (1988).
56. Lustig, supra note 55, at 818-27.
57. Id. at 827.
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essentially antitakeover statutes.5" Most of the provisions of these laws are
beyond the scope of this article, which will discuss only greenmail provisions.
It should first be noted, however, that traditional state corporation law
statutes have been generally either silent or specifically permissive on the
question of corporate stock repurchases. 59 Therefore, any statute making
the payment of greenmail unlawful is an exception to the general rule
permitting repurchases. In addition, shareholders generally are free to obtain
the highest possible price when selling their shares. Accordingly, any greenmall prohibitions aimed at the greenmailer are also exceptional.
The formulation of state antigreenmail statutes is generally similar, and
prohibits a corporate repurchase of a significant block of stock (in some
cases 3%, in some 5%, and, in New York, as high as 10%) that has been
held for a short period of time (ranging from 6 months to 3 years) without
a majority shareholder vote or an equal offer to all shareholders.6 A new
Pennsylvania statute goes beyond outlawing greenmail and requires anyone
who declares an intent to buy more than a 20% stake in a company to
disgorge profits on recently purchased shares sold within 18 months after
6
the announcement. '
These statutes are premised on the unfairness of permitting the greenmailer to enjoy a premium, rather than on the greenmailer's coercive
conduct. The question of whether greenmail is a tort for whieh the greenmailer can be held accountable has been left to judicial decision-making. 62
D.

Private Ordering and the ALI Corporate Governance Project

A popular academic theory of the past decade has been that corporations
are a nexus of contracts, and private ordering should replace government-

58. See Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 846 (1989); Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of CorporationLaw?, 45 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 903 (1988); Romano, The PoliticalEconomy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L.
REv. 111 (1987); De Facto FederalAnti-Bidder Stance Exists Through State Laws, IRRC Says,
21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1501 (Oct. 6, 1989).
59. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The Ohio
statute, for example, provides that a corporation may purchase shares "when the articles
authorize the redemption of such shares and do not prohibit such purchase." OHio REv. CODE
ANN. § 1701.35 (A)(1) (Page 1985). Open market repurchases by a public company may be
regulated by the Williams Act and SEC rules thereunder. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive
Stock Repurchases, 99 HAZv. L. REv. 1377 (1986).
60. 1990 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 85 § 10-1204 (West); Mich. Bus. Corp. Act § 340.368
(1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.553 (West 1989); N.Y. Bus. CoaP. L. §§ 513(e), 912(aa)
(Consol. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-501 to 505 (1988); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 180.725(5)
(West 1989). An Indiana statute authorizing certain issuer stock redemptions was passed with
the caution that such authorization should prevent sellers from asking for greenmail. IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-10 (Bums 1989).
61. 1990 Pa. Act 36, SB 1310 (April 17, 1990) (to be codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

15, § 25-74 (Purdon 1990)). See Klein & Greenbaum, Many Pa. Companies Opt Out, Nat'l
L.J., Sept. 10, 1990, at 15.
62. See Note, Liability for Greenmailers:A Tort Is Born, 19 IND. L. REv. 761 (1986).
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mandated standards of fiduciary duty.63 In its extreme form, this theory
argues that markets effectively discipline all corporate charter provisions.
Therefore, all corporate rules of fiduciary duty should be the product of
private ordering, not government regulation. 64 A more moderate view is
that private ordering should be permitted within a general framework of
government-mandated fiduciary duties as set forth in statutes or as interpreted by the judiciary.6 5
An interesting example of this more moderate contractarian view that
corporations can elect to "opt out" of fiduciary duties within certain public
policy limits can be found in several advisory and council drafts of the
Corporate Governance Project (Project) of the American Law Institute
(ALI), concerning greenmail in the context of transactions in control. This
Project is not a traditional restatement, but rather a "prestatement" of
what good corporate law should be, and its recommendations are designed
to be implemented either by statute or by judicial decision making. Part VI
of the Project, addressed to "Actions Affecting Fundamental Shareholder
Rights (Including Transactions in Control)," initially envisioned (in Advisory
Draft No. 7) the use of shareholder action to respond to transactions in
control. 66 A central focus of corporate governance therefore set forth was
the freedom to adopt special charter or by-law provisions to alter standard
corporate structures.67
The freedom which shareholders were given in Advisory Draft No. 7
to change charter documents, however, was limited by public policy as
expressed in cases and corporation statutes. 6 In addition, certain defensive
strategies in takeovers, including greenmail, were prohibited, as follows:
A corporation may repurchase its voting equity securities on a nonpro rata basis and at a premium price only if such repurchase:
(1) Is intended to reduce or eliminate holders of a small number of
shares;
(2) Involves an amount of securities that is not significant and is
repurchased from shareholders who have held the securities for a
significant period of time;
(3) Has been approved by disinterested shareholders, and does not
constitute a waste of corporate assets ... or
(4) Is necessary to prevent immediate and substantial injury to the
corporation. 69
63. See ContractualFreedom in CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv. No. 7 (Nov. 1989),
(symposium issue devoted to discussion of this theory).

64. E.g., Butler & Ribstein, Opting Out of FiduciaryDuties; A Response to the AntiContractarians,65 WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1990).
65. Coffee, No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation,and the
Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 919 (1988).
66. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
RECOMMENDATIONS 34 (Advisory Group Draft No. 7, 1986).
67. Id. at 36.
68. Id. at § 6.01(b).
69. Id. at § 6.16(b).
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Because shareholders can vote to pay greenmail, this section is consistent
with contractarian theory. Indeed, the argument can be made that such a
prohibition against greenmail facilitates rather than displaces private ordering, because decisions concerning greenmail payments are put directly to
the shareholders.
The Comment on this section states that the section could be implemented by judicial decision,70 which is curious because it reads like a statute
and indeed follows the pattern of the federal securities law proposals
outlawing greenmail that were never adopted. The Comment explains that
the section differs from existing case law, which inquires into director
motivation or principal purpose to determine the legitimacy of corporate
7
repurchases, and instead adopts a functional standard. '
Part VI of the ALI Project proved too controversial to survive as
envisioned, and the antigreenmail provision was successively watered down
before being completely dropped. 72 As of the date of this Article,, Part VI
has been transformed into a general and platitudinous injunction against
management entrenchment. 73 The legality of any greenmail payments presumably could be tested under current Delaware and other relevant case
law.
Although the philosophy of the ALI Reporters as set forth in the initial
drafts of Part VI did not prevail in the Project, numerous corporations
have adopted antigreenmail charter provisions consistent with the ALI
Advisory Draft No. 7 language set forth above. One of the first to do so,
in 1984, was International Minerals & Chemical Corp. (IMC). 74 Over the
next three years, about 70 publicly traded corporations adopted -similar
amendments. 75 In addition, in 1988 an antigreenmail shareholder proposal
by the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) won 55%
of the vote of a public corporation. 76 Antigreenmail charter provisions
typically require an affirmativ shareholder vote before the purchase of

70. Id. at 248.
71. Id.
72. See AmEicAN LAW INSTTE, PRiNcIPLEs
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§ 6.04 (Advisory Group Draft No. 8, 1987); (Council Draft No. 10,
Jan. 26, 1988); (Council Draft No. 11, April 20, 1988); (Council Draft No. 12, Sept. 8, 1988);
ALI Tentative Draft No. 10, supra note 21.
73. Section 6.02(a) of ALI Tentative Draft No. 10, supra note 21, provides: "The board
of directors may take any action that has the foreseeable effect of blocking an unsolicited
tender offer . . . unless the action would materially disfavor the long term interests of the
shareholders." At the May, 1990 meeting of the ALI a floor amendment to add "corporation
and its" immediately before "shareholders" to this provision passed. See Departing From
Draft, ALI Supports Broader Takeover Defense Authority, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
843-44 (June 1, 1990).
74. This corporation has since changed its name to IMCERA Group, Inc. The author
has been a director of the company since 1980. See generally Siegel, How to Foil Greenmail,
FoRTuNE, Jan. 21, 1985, at 157, 158.
75. Gilson, supra note 5, at 331 n.6.
76. Remarks of Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman David S. Ruder, "The
Impact of Institutional Investors on Large Corporations" (Oct. 11, 1988).
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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shares at a premium above market price from a short term shareholder
77
unless an offer on the same terms is made to all shareholders.
E.

Summary of Solutions

The various legislative and private ordering initiatives to outlaw greenmail appear to acknowledge that the payment of greenmail would be best
judged under the fiduciary duty standard of directors to the company and
7
its shareholders8.
Nevertheless, the latitude given to directors under the
business judgment rule to resist hostile takeovers has placed egregious
greenmail payments beyond shareholder scrutiny, and a regulatory response
may therefore be necessary.
Two basic solutions for greenmail have been proposed. The most
popular, which originated with the Advisory Committee and the SEC and
has been adopted in state laws and corporate charter provisions concerning
greenmail, has been to require a shareholders' vote before greenmail can
be paid, or in the alternative, to require the issuer to make a tender offer
to all shareholders. Another solution has been to squeeze the profit out of
greenmail and therefore penalize the greenmailer. Congress did so through
its 50% tax on greenmail profits. In addition, proposed federal legislation
developed the idea that greenmail profits should be reclaimed by the
corporation, or its shareholders in a derivative action, similar to the recap79
ture of short swing insider trading profits.
Although this idea was not put into law because federal tender offer
reform ran into political opposition and failed, it poses some interesting
theoretical questions. Is greenmail, like insider trading, an intentional tort,
based on unfair advantage, for which liability could or should be imposed?
If so, should such liability be under federal or state law or both? If a duty
to the corporation or its shareholders must be found in order to impose
liability on the greenmailer what is the nature of that duty?

IV. THE
A.

GREENmAm CASES

Breach of FiduciaryDuty

Considering the widespread incidence of greenmail,80 there are relatively
few cases attacking the practice. Most of them have been brought on the

77. The IMC charter applied to purchases from a holder of 3% for less than 2 years at
a price above the highest closing sale price during the 30 day period preceding the purchase.
Interestingly, the antigreenmail amendment provided that it should not be construed to relieve
any greenmailer from any fiduciary obligation imposed by law. Gilson, supra note 5, discusses
the theoretical problems of drafting anti-greenmail charter provisions.
78. "Tender Offer Disclosure and Fairness Act of 1987," Report of the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to Accompany S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec.
17, 1987) at 33.
79. Id. at 33-34.
80. According to an SEC staff study, from January 1979 to March 1984 approximately
$5.5 billion was paid by issuers to repurchase blocks of stock from individual shareholders,
at an aggregate premium of more than $1.0 billion. Much of this premium was greenmail. Id.
at 32-33.
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theory that the payment of greenmail was a breach of fiduciary duty by
the directors who authorized the payment. Generally, such directors have
been able to claim the benefits of the business judgment rule., 1 Very
generally, the cases fall into the Delaware mode of affording directors the
shield of the business judgment rule for greenmail payments; the California
mode of screening conflicts of interest; and the New York and federal cases
which try to find a middle ground between permitting control sales and
outlawing greenmail.
1. Delaware
The Delaware courts have been generous in affording directors the
protection of the business judgment rule in greenmail payment cases. The
basic proposition that directors may forestall a takeover bid by way of a
selective stock repurchase, provided the transaction is free from fraud or
unfairness, unless they have acted solely or primarily out of a desire to
perpetuate themselves in office,8 2 was established in a series of cases in the
early 1960s before the term "greenmail" became well known.
The first case was Kors v. Carey,8 3 in which the chancery court exonerated the directors of Lehn & Fink Products Corporation (Lehn), a drug
and cosmetics manufacturer. The directors had authorized the purchase at
a premium through a broker of a 16% block of its stock owned by United
Whelan Corporation (United), a drugstore chain that was a major customer
of Lehn. Ownership of Lehn by United would have affected Lehn's relationship and reputation with other customers. Lehn and United had fundamentally different business strategies and policies. United stressed liquidity,
aggressive advertising, and quick profits. United dealt directly with manufacturers, which posed antitrust problems. The court found no evidence
that management was seeking to retain control of the corporation, although
some directors were Lehn executives. The court also found that United
posed a serious threat to the welfare of the corporation and its shareholders.
In any event, the court was unable to see how the plaintiff was damaged,
and the case was complicated by a cross-claim by United, also named as a
defendant, to rescind the purchase by Lehn.
In Bennett v. Propp4 the Delaware Supreme Court approved Kors v.
Carey but nevertheless affirmed liability as to the chairman of the board
81. The business judgment rule shields directors from liability for disinterested business
decisions made with due care, in good faith, and without an abuse of discretion. BLOCK,
BARTON & RAniN, supra note 1, at 12. In order for the business judgment rule to apply to
antitakeover measures, the board must demonstrate good faith and a reasonable investigation
to prove that protection of the corporate enterprise and shareholders is necessary, and the
defensive measures must be reasonable in the face of the threat posed. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
82. See Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536-37 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
83. 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Del. Ch. 1960). See also Martin v. American Potash
& Chemical Corp., 92 A.2d 295 (Del. 1952).
84. 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962).
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of Noma Lites, Inc. (Noma), who purchased over 22% of Noma's stock in
the open market in order to defeat an anticipated takeover by Textron, Inc.
The chairman did not notify the board of these repurchases until after they
had been made and the corporation was required to borrow money from a
factor against its accounts receivable to close the transactions. Testimony
showed that retaining control of the corporation was the chairman's motivation behind the share repurchase. The president of Noma, who had been
informed of the purchases, was held jointly and severally liable for what
'8
the court labelled "the tort of using corporate funds to maintain control.
The directors who approved the purchase in a resolution were exonerated
on the grounds that they acted reasonably when confronted with this
emergency, and that they avoided the potential liability to Noma if the
trades were not closed. While Bennett is not a greenmail case, it is important
because it established the principle that if board members act solely or
primarily because of the desire to perpetuate themselves in office, the use
of corporate funds for a repurchase of shares is improper.
This principle was tested in Cheff v. Mathes, 6 which is considered the
leading case in Delaware on greenmail. Cheff was a derivative action by
common stockholders of Holland Furnace Co. (Holland), seeking to set
aside a purchase by Holland of its own stock at a premium over market
from Motor Products Corp. (Motor), which was controlled by Arnold H.
Maremont (Maremont), and to obtain damages from Holland's directors.
Holland was engaged in the manufacture of hot air furnaces and air
conditioners, and was unique in the industry because it used its own retail
sales force. However, its sales techniques were of questionable legality, and
involved the company and its president in litigation with the Federal Trade
Commission. In early 1957, Holland went through a reorganization to stem
declining sales. In June 1957 exchange trading in Holland's stock doubled.
Maremont, met with P.T. Cheff, director and CEO of Holland, and proposed
a Holland-Motor merger. When this offer was declined, Maremont disclaimed further interest. However, in July, Maremont told another director
that he owned 55,000 Holland shares and in August he demanded a seat
on Holland's board. According to the defendants, Maremont threatened to
break up Holland's sales staff, which led to employee unrest. The board
then authorized market purchases of Holland stock for use in a stock option
plan (which never materialized). After consulting with independent legal
counsel, investigating Maremont and discovering that he had a reputation
as someone who made quick profits by selling or liquidating companies and
that Motor was in questionable financial condition, Holland determined to
purchase Maremont's shares. In October, a total of 155,000 shares were
purchased from Motor at a premium over market. Katherine N. Cheff, as
a director or through a company under her control, had been prepared to
buy Maremont's stock if Holland had not done so.

85. Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405, 411 (1962).
86. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
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The Delaware court struggled with the basic issues that have been at
the heart of all subsequent takeover cases. On the one hand, there was
evidence of management entrenchment at shareholder expense. The Vice
Chancellor had found that the actual purpose behind the purchase from
Motor was the desire to perpetuate control. However, not all the directors
knew of the alternative possibility that Mrs. Cheff could have bought
Maremont's stock, and they were exonerated. On the other hand, the
Delaware Supreme Court viewed Maremont as a threat to the continued
existence of the corporation, a threat that the directors could use corporate
funds to counteract. The court viewed its decision as turning on burden of
proof questions and held that, except for the directors who had a personal
pecuniary interest in the transaction (Mr. Cheff-and Holland's attorney),
there was no self-dealing. Accordingly, in order to enjoy the benefit of the
business judgment rule, the defendants, merely had to show reasonable
grounds to believe a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed by
the presence of the Maremont stock ownership. Although the Vice Chancellor found there was no substantial evidence of a liquidation posed by
Maremont, the Court held that the defendants' fear that Maremont would
change the sales policies Holland believed vital to its future success was
sufficient.
There were two aspects of the transaction in Cheff that the court
scrutinized. One was the use of corporate funds to purchase Maremont's
stock. The court held that because it was not improper for the corporation
to use its funds to purchase Maremont's stock, the existence of an alternative
purchaser was irrelevant. The other aspect of the purchase under attack was
the premium price paid. The parties to the case conceded that a substantial
block will command a control premium. However, the plaintiff argued that
it was inappropriate for the corporation to pay a control premium, because
control is meaningless to an acquisition by a corporation of its own shares.
The court held that because the holder of a substantial block would expect
to receive a premium for control, it was not unreasonable for the corporation
to pay that premium.
Cheff has been followed in subsequent cases upholding greenmail payments as a valid exercise of directors' discretion under the business judgment
rule.87 Moreover, the rationale of Cheff is strikingly similar to the Delaware
Supreme Court's recent business judgment rule decisions upholding antitakeover strategies in addition to greenmail."8 Nevertheless, the tolerance for
greenmail by the Delaware courts is not unlimited. Good v. Texaco, Inc. 9
87. See Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986); Grobow v. Perot, 526 A.2d 914 (Del.
Ch. 1987), aff'd, 539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556 (Del. Ch.
1977). Cf. Crane v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294 (D. Del. 1981). See also BLOCK, BARTON
& RADiN, supra note 1, at 417.
88. E.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989);
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Co., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
89. Civ. Action No. 7501 (Del. Ch. May 14, 1984) reprinted in 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461.
Accord, Seibert v. Harper & Row, Civ. Action No. 6639 (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 1984).
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involved the purchase by Texaco, Inc. (Texaco), of a 9.9% common stock
interest owned by the Bass Brothers at a premium over market, for $650
million cash and 12.6 million shares of newly issued voting preferred stock.
The voting rights were equal to the voting rights of the common stock, and
constituted approximately 5% of the total voting power of all of Texaco's
outstanding shares. The Bass Brothers agreed to acquire no more shares
for a period of ten years and to vote their Texaco preferred stock in
accordance with the recommendation of Texaco's board of directors. A
motion to dismiss for failure to make demand was denied on the ground
that the purchase of 5% of the voting stock by Texaco's board made the
directors "interested" and supported allegations of an illegal vote buying
scheme. Three days later, Texaco and the Bass Brothers entered into a
modification of the agreement to provide that the 12.6 million preferred
shares would be voted not by the directors, but rather proportionately to
all other votes cast by Texaco shareholders, and thereafter the case was
settled. 90
In Polk v. Good9 the plaintiffs argued that Kors, Cheff and Bennett
should not be interpreted to permit greenmail to those who threaten proxy
fights and tender offers, but should be limited to those instances where
dissident shareholders threaten to interfere with the day-to-day business
operations of a company. The court gave short shrift to this plea to prevent
the corruption of corporate democracy, and suggested that fraud or unfairness was required for liability.9 2 If there is any premise underlying the
Delaware cases it is that the stockholders to whom greenmail is paid pose
serious threats to proper business values because they are looking for shortterm profits through the trading and liquidation of stock and business
assets. Therefore, directors are justified in using corporate funds to assure
corporate survival by eliminating such dangerous shareholders. 93
An interesting interpretation of Delaware law by a federal court is
contained in Fry v. Trump,94 which, in addition to claims under the federal
securities laws, alleged breach of fiduciary duty, waste of corporate assets
and an illegal payment of greenmail by Bally Manufacturing Company
(Bally) to its former shareholder Donald J. Trump (Trump). In addition,
Trump was charged with aiding and abetting the directors' breach of
fiduciary duty and also with independently breaching his duty to Bally as
a shareholder. The greenmail payment at issue was at a premium far in
excess of market value. Also, it involved the dropping of a counterclaim
by Trump in litigation brought against Trump by Bally and a 10-year
standstill agreement. Trump never owned more than 9.9% of Bally stock.

90. Civ. Action No. 7501 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 1985), reprinted in 10 DEL. J. CORP. L.
854.
91. 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986).
92. Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536-37 (Del. 1986). This circumlocution begs the issue:
when is greenmail fraudulent or unfair?
93. Cf. Gilson, Just Say No To Whom?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 121 (1990).
94. 681 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.J. 1988).
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On a motion to dismiss, the allegations that the directors breached their
fiduciary duty to shareholders by paying Trump a premium to buy his stock
were conceded. The court ruled that the facts alleged supported a claim
that Trump participated in the directors' attempts to entrench themselves
and therefore aided and abetted their breach of fiduciary duty.
As to any director breach of duty by Trump, the court ruled that only
a majority or controlling shareholder owes any fiduciary duty- to a corporation. Clearly, Trump was not a majority shareholder, and the plaintiff
failed to allege facts that could support claims that Trump directed Bally's
day-to-day activities. Therefore, the court held that Trump was not a
controlling shareholder and owed no independent duty to Bally.
2.

California

In Heckman v. Ahmanson9 a California appellate court sustained both
a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the directors of Walt Disney
Productions, Inc. (Disney) and a claim against greenmailers for aiding and
abetting the directors' breach of duty. The greenmailers were Saul P.
Steinberg and various companies under his control or acting in concert with
him (the Steinberg Group), who in March 1984 purchased more than two
million shares of Disney stock. Disney countered this opening shot in a
probable takeover war by announcing the acquisition of Arvida Corporation
(Arvida) for $200 million in newly issued Disney stock and the assumption
of $190 million of Arvida debt. The Steinberg Group brought a direct and
a derivative action in federal court to block the Arvida acquisition, but the
transaction was consummated nonetheless. The Steinberg Group then acquired two million additional shares of Disney stock, so that it then had a
12% ownership position in the company and, on June 8, 1984, advised the
Disney directors of its intention to make a tender offer for 49% of the
outstanding shares. That evening the Disney directors proposed a repurchase
of all stock held by the Steinberg Group, and an agreement to this effect
was reached on June 11, 1990. In return, the Steinberg Group agreed not
to purchase any Disney stock and to dismiss its individual (but not the
derivative) claims in the Arvida litigation. Disney was required to borrow
money to effect this repurchase. The Steinberg Group made a profit of
about $60 million on this greenmail transaction, which was 50% above
market price immediately following the announcement of the repurchase.
On an appeal from the grant of a preliminary injunction by the Steinberg
Group, the California Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits, entitling them
to a constructive trust upon the profits the Steinberg Group received from
its sale of Disney stock. The basis for a finding of liability was two-fold.
First, the court held that there was insufficient evidence that the Disney
directors acted in good faith and inherent fairness or for reasons other than

95. 168 Cal. App. 3d 199, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985).
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the naked desire to retain their positions of power and control over the
corporation. It therefore appeared that the Disney directors (who were not
parties to the proceedings on the preliminary injunction) breached their
fiduciary duty to the shareholders and, consequently, the Steinberg Group
could be held jointly liable as an aider and abetter. The second basis of
liability was that the Steinberg Group had assumed a fiduciary duty to
other Disney shareholders when it sued Disney in a derivative action. Having
assumed this fiduciary role, the Steinberg Group could not abandon it for
personal aggrandizement.96
The plaintiff had also contended that the Steinberg Group violated the
fiduciary duty owed by controlling shareholders to other shareholders. In
this regard, California has strong precedent to the effect that majority
shareholders may not use their power to control corporate activities to
benefit themselves alone or in a manner detrimental to the minority by the
transfer of controlling shares. 97 However, the court declined to decide this
question, holding that the record was inadequate on the issue of whether
the Steinberg Group was a controlling shareholder when it sold its stock to
Disney. "Although it never owned more than about 12 percent of the
outstanding Disney stock this is not determinative of control. The question,
a factual one, is what amount of influence it could exert on the corporation
by reason of its holdings.""
In a case arising out of the same facts the Second Circuit refused to
find that the Steinberg Group had engaged in economic duress under New
York lavw. 99 The court held that to establish duress there needed to be a
threat that was unlawfully made and caused involuntary acceptance of
contract terms because the circumstances permitted no other alternative.
According to the court, it was not duress to threaten a tender offer, because
a tender offer is lawful. 100
3.

New York

There is sparse case law in the New York courts concerning the legality
0l
of greenmail. In Karfunkel v. USLIFE Corp.1
a repurchase of 6% of its

96. A similar theory was asserted against Trump in Fry v. Trump, 681 F. Supp. 252
(D.N.J. 1988), as to his counterclaim against Bally, but because the counterclaim was personal
and not derivative, this theory of liability was rejected; see supra note 94 and accompanying
text (discussing Fry v. Trump).
97. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969). This was not a normal sale of control case, but rather involved a scheme in which the
majority shareholders set up a holding company in a manner which made the minority shares
unmarketable. See also Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969).
98. Heckman v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 133 n.6, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177, 187
n.6.
99. Kamerman v. Steinberg, 891 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1989).
100. Id. at 431-32.
101. 116 Misc.2d 841, 455 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1982), aff'd, 98 App. Div. 2d 628,
469 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1st Dept. 1983).
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stock by USLIFE Corp. (USLIFE) from American General Corp. (American) at a premium over market triggered shareholder derivative and direct
actions. The position had been acquired by American over a period of four
years and was sold at $28 per share, which was below book value, but was
above the market price of $22.25. American had never sought control of
USLIFE. The court found no breach of duty and granted summary judgment.
One of the plaintiff's theories was that when a corporation purchases
stock from one shareholder at a premium, it must offer the same terms
and conditions to other shareholders on a pro rata basis. In rejecting this
claim, the court noted that a New York corporation has a free right to
purchase stock, with no limitations except fraud, overreaching, impairment
of capital, or harm to creditors. Such a purchase "might be to remove the
threat of a corporate raider whose ultimate goal might result in harm to
the long-term aims of the corporation."' 102 The court also pointed out that
the repurchase increased book value and earnings per share for the remaining
shareholders.
In Feinberg Testamentary Trust v. Carter'03 the court viewed New York
law as more restrictive. This derivative action arose out of the purchase by
the B.F. Goodrich Company (Goodrich), a New York corporation, from
Carl Icahn (Icahn) and affiliated partnerships of a 4.9% block of Goodrich
stock. When Icahn had informed the Goodrich directors of his purchase he
stated that he planned to acquire as much as 30% of the outstanding shares,
and if a takeover failed to materialize, to obtain a seat on Goodrich's
board. However, Icahn also simultaneously made a firm offer to sell his
initial holdings of over one million shares at $35 a share, which was
approximately 25% above the market price of $28. A few weeks later the
board accepted Icahn's $35 per share offer and then repurchased the shares
with the proceeds of short term loans. Icahn entered into a standstill
agreement under which he agreed to abstain from any Goodrich stock
purchases for five years. He also agreed not to disclose the repurchase or
standstill agreement.1°4
On a motion to dismiss, the court held that the defendants had not
made any showing of a justification for the repurchase, which would
significantly benefit board members by securing the continued possession
of their directorships. The court held that the greenmail payment was a
breach of fiduciary duty and waste under New York law. The court
distinguished the Karfunkel case'05 on its facts and disregarded the only
other pertinent New York decision.? 6 In the court's view there was no

102. Karfunkel v. USLIFE Corp., 116 Misc. 2d 841, 845, 455 N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (Sup.
Ct. 1982), aff'd, 98 App. Div. 2d 628, 469 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1st Dept. 1983).
103. 652 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
104. This nondisclosure by Icahn and Goodrich led to an SEC proceeding against Goodrich. Securities Act Rel. No. 6619, 34 SEC DOCKET 1263 (Jan. 14, 1986).
105. Karfunkel, 116 Misc. 2d 841, 445 N.Y.S.2d 937.
106. Lewis v. Kurshan, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 1983, at 6, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. 1983). The court
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justification for the purchase, which "resulted in an $8 million loss to
Goodrich, with no corresponding benefit to Goodrich shareholders. The
only beneficiaries under the repurchase, other than Icahn, were the Goodrich
7
directors, who insured their continued control of the company."'0
The court then went on to consider Icahn's liability, and was troubled
that Icahn's 4.9 percent ownership did not make him a controlling shareholder with a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders. However, the court
found that there was ample authority for the proposition that "outsiders,
whatever their interest, who attempt to reap benefits through their participation in unconscionable stock transactions may be held liable for aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty."'' 0
In Lou v. Belzberg,'09 which followed Feinberg, a federal district court
sustained a claim by a shareholder of Ashland Oil, Inc. (Ashland) against
the Belzbergs in connection with a greenmail payment for aiding and abetting
a breach of fiduciary duty, even though the claim against the directors was
dismissed for failure to make demand. Even though the payment was not
above the market, a standstill agreement was executed. The court held there
was an adequate allegation that the Belzbergs sought to take advantage of
the directors' entrenchment motives. Although Ashland was a Kentucky
corporation, in the absence of precedent on point, the court applied Feinberg, but distinguished Feinberg on the facts.
B.

Federal Securities Laws

Plaintiffs in greenmail cases who have been frustrated in trying to allege
a breach of fiduciary duty by directors who paid greenmail, or to find a
theory under state law for holding the greenmailer liable for an independent
tort, have sued under the federal securities laws. Various theories under the
federal securities laws have been attempted with some, but not resounding,
success. The cases which have been most successful are those in which
greenmail either was not disclosed or was, indeed, denied, thereby allowing
the plaintiffs to press a claim for fraudulent misstatements. Cases brought
on behalf of a corporation which paid greenmail, alleging antifraud violations but no affirmative misrepresentations, have generally failed, either
because the court held that the corporation and its directors were not
deceived by the greenmailer, or because the court viewed the complaint as
an impermissible effort to charge a breach of fiduciary duty.
0
In Feinberg Testamentary Trust v. Carter"
Goodrich proposed an antigreenmail amendment to its charter in its 1985 Proxy Statement. Previously,

stated that this case had relied only on a Seventh Circuit precedent interpreting Delaware law,
rather than New York law. Instead the court relied on a Second Circuit case applying New
York law to a Panamanian corporation.
107. Feinberg Testamentary Trust v. Carter, 652 F. Supp. 1006, 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
108. Id.at 1083.
109. 728 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
110. 652 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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although Goodrich had disclosed a repurchase of 1,171,700 shares of its
stock, it had not disclosed that the purchase was from an individual
stockholder, Icahn, who had threatened a tender offer, or that the purchase
was at a price significantly above market. The initial 1985 Proxy Statement
did not mention the repurchase, but a Supplemental Proxy Statement
contained some information about it. However, it failed to name Icahn or
describe his threats to purchase 30% of Goodrich or take over the company.
The court denied a motion to dismiss holding that the failure to inform
shareholders that the Icahn repurchase was a classic greenmail transaction
violated the SEC's proxy Rule 14a-9."1
Similarly, in Fry v. Trump" 2 the plaintiffs claimed that Trump made
several public statements indicating that he was not a greenmailer, and he
was looking out for the welfare of Bally shareholders, when in fact he was
negotiating a greenmail transaction. The court found this misrepresentation
actionable under SEC Rule lOb-5." 3 Also, in In re Phillips Petroleum
Securities Litigation"4 the Third Circuit held that a false announcement by
T. Boone Pickens Jr. (Pickens) in connection with an announcement of a
tender offer for Phillips Petroleum Co. (Phillips) that he would not sell any
shares back to Phillips except on an equal basis with all shareholders, could
be the basis for a suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Law (RICO). 5s
At one time the SEC took the position that a Rule lOb-5 claim was
stated by allegations that a corporation was defrauded when its controlling
directors caused, it to acquire a large block of its own stock at an excessive
price for the purpose of removing the threat to the directors' control
represented by the stock." 6 This argument was rejected by the Second
Circuit on the ground that there was no deception because the entire board
of directors was involved." 7 Subsequently, however, the Second Circuit
overruled itself on this issue in a case not involving greenmail, and held
that the entire board may defraud the corporation if there is a conflict of
interest involved and the directors expect to obtain a personal benefit." 8

111. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1990).
112.
113.
114.
115.

681 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.J. 1988).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
881 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1989).
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). Such a claim was dismissed in Lou v. Belzberg, 728

F. Supp. 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In prior proceedings the RICO claim was dismissed, but the
fraud claim was maintained. In re Phillips Petroleum Litigation, 697 F. Supp. 1344, aff'd in
part and vacated in part, 881 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1988).
116. Brief for the SEC, Amicus Curiae, O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 767 (2d Cir.
1964). See generally Bayne, The S.E.C. and the Sale of Control: Ambivalence, Vacillation or
Pusillanimity?, 33 Vi.. L. REv. 49 (1988).
117. O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964). Another potential problem is that

the plaintiff may be neither a purchaser nor seller and therefore lack standing to sue. See
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
118. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom.
Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
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Nevertheless, in Kamerman v. Steinberg"9 the court held that the greenmailing of Disney by the Steinberg Group failed to state a claim under
Section 10(b) because Disney was not deceived.
Also of relevance is the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Santa
Fe Industries v. Green, 20 involving a gross undervaluation of shares in a
Delaware short form merger, that Congress did not mean to prohibit, in
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 2 ' any conduct not involving manipulation or deception; that is, corporate mismanagement and unfairness are
not within the federal anti-fraud provisions. Nevertheless, in Goldberg v.
Meridor22 the Second Circuit distinguished Santa Fe in a case involving an
entire board, but in which there was a fraud on the corporation by the sale
of overpriced assets for stock. No disclosure of this breach of fiduciary
duty was made to minority shareholders, and the court held that such nondisclosure violated the Exchange Act.
How these somewhat contradictory precedents apply to a case involving
greenmail under the federal securities laws in unclear. In Pin v. Texaco,
Inc.,123 involving the repurchase of a 9.9% block of stock held by the Bass
Brothers at a premium over market after they threatened a takeover of
Texaco, the Fifth Circuit held that, under Santa Fe, in the absence of any
allegation of misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact, the
Section 10(b) claim failed. The Bass Brothers were not required to disclose
in their filings with the SEC that they intended to greenmail Texaco from
the outset. "As to Texaco, the complaint alleges nothing more than corporate mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duty that are traditionally
a matter of state regulation."'2
V.
A.

THEoRms OF LIABILITY

Pretendersto the Sale of Control

1. Shareholder Fiduciary Duties
The mere ownership of stock does not create a fiduciary relation between
shareholders. l2 Nevertheless, when a shareholder assumes the power to

119.
120.
121.
122.

891 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1989).
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).

123. 793 F.2d 1448 (5th Cir. 1986). This case grew out of the same facts as the cases

discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 89-91.
124. Pin v. Texaco, Inc., 793 F.2d 1448, 1452 (5th Cir. 1986).
125. See McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969) (involving sale of control
block); Vernon J. Rockier & Co. v. Minneapolis Shareholders Co., 425 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D.
Minn. 1977) (denying motion to enjoin company's largest shareholder from proceeding with
tender offer). But see Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657
(1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 592-93, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975)
(holding that shareholders in close corporation have same fiduciary relation as partners).
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control corporate property or decision making, the shareholder also assumes
a fiduciary relation to the corporation and other shareholders with respect
to the corporate action taken. 126 Such a controlling or dominant shareholder
is considered to have the same duty as directors to deal fairly and with
complete candor with minority shareholders. 2 7 Generally, such a fiduciary
relation is imposed only on a controlling shareholder, 128 but where a minority
the majority, he can be held liable
shareholder is in a position to oppress
29
for a breach of the duty of loyalty.
Shareholder fiduciary duties are grounded upon the power to manage
the property of other shareholders. This power usually derives from majority
stock ownership, but the duty devolves from the exercise of power, not
from formal control. 30 It is "the fact of control of the common property
in which
held and exercised, not the particular means by which or manner
' 13
the control is exercised, that creates the fiduciary obligation.' '
When a shareholder becomes a fiduciary he is under a duty to act for
the benefit of the corporation and other shareholders as to the matters with
respect to which power is being exercised. As to such matters, he is under
a duty not to profit at the expense of the corporation and other shareholders
and not to enter into competition with them without their consent. 32 If a
greenmailer were made subject to such a fiduciary duty, as this article
argues, he would be obligated either to: (1) decline the greenmail payment;
(2) share that payment with other shareholders; or (3) receive the payment
only after a fully informed shareholder vote.
The policy reason behind imposing a fiduciary duty on a controlling or
dominant stockholder is that suppliers of capital must be able to repose

126. Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 1973); Smith v. Atlantic
Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981).
127. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
128. Osofsky v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 725 F.2d 1057, 1060 (2d Cir. 1984). See also
infra note 146.
129. Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 24-25 (E.D. Pa.
1940); Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 402 Mass. 650, 657-58, 524 N.E.2d 849, 853-54 (1988); Smith
v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981).
130. Harriman v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101 (D.C. Del. 1974).
Cf. Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941
(1963). The concept of control by a majority shareholder is nebulous in any event and does
not require a 51% ownership of the voting common stock. See ALI Tentative Draft No. 10,
supra note 21, at § 1.06a; Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of CorporateControl, 50 CORNELL
L.Q. 628, 630-31 (1965). See also Sherman, Buyers of Control Get a Lot More Than They
Pay For, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1989, at A20, col. 3.
131. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492 (1919). See also Meinhard v. Salmon,
249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). In United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913, involving a novel case of breach of fiduciary duty and
extortion by a political party chairman, the court suggested that fiduciary duty arises from
reliance and/or de facto control and dominance. Id. at 122, 125. It can be argued that other
shareholders rely on the greenmailer to initiate a tender offer, but this reliance is perhaps
questionable. However, the greenmailer does exercise de facto control over the initiation of a
control contest.
132. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 comment b (1959).
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trust and confidence in managers of their capital. This rationale was
persuasively argued by Harlan Fiske Stone (before he was named to the
Supreme Court) in an address he gave in 1934 after a period of securities
speculation having many similarities to the bull market of the 1980s.
I venture to assert that when the history of the financial era which
has just drawn to a close comes to be written, most of its mistakes
and its major faults will be ascribed to the failure to observe the
fiduciary principle, the precept as old as holy writ, that "a man
cannot serve two masters." More than a century ago equity gave a
hospitable reception to that principle and the common law was not
slow to follow in giving it recognition. No thinking man can believe
that an economy built upon a business foundation can permanently
endure without some loyalty to that principle. The separation of
ownership from management, the development of the corporate
structure so as to vest in small groups control over the resources
of great numbers of small and uninformed investors, make imperative a fresh and active devotion to that principle if the modern
world of business is to perform its proper function. Yet those who
serve nominally as trustees, but relieved, by clever legal devices,
from the obligation to protect those whose interests they purport
to represent, corporate officers and directors who award to themselves huge bonuses from corporate funds without the assent or
even the knowledge of their stockholders, reorganization committees
created to serve interests of others than those whose securities they
control, financial institutions which, in the finite variety of their
operations, consider only last, if at all, the interests of those whose
funds they command, suggest how far we have ignored the necessary
implications of that principle. The loss and suffering inflicted on
individuals, the harm done to a social order founded upon business
33
and dependent upon its integrity, are incalculable.
2.

Sale of Control

There is an extensive body of literature on the question of whether
control is an asset belonging to a controlling or dominant shareholder or
34
an asset belonging to the corporation or the shareholders as a body.
Stated differently, there is a basic conflict between the view, on the one
hand, that shares of stock are property and their owner is free to sell them
to anyone for any price and keep the profit, and the view, on the other

133. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 H.xv. L. Rav. 1, 8-9 (1934).

134. See Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares,
78 H~Av. L. REv. 505 (1965); Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L.
Rav. 22 (1963); Berle, supra note 130, at 634-36; Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 716-18 (1982); Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of

Controlling Shares: A Reply to ProfessorAndrews, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 420, 422-23 (1965).
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hand, that a controlling or dominant shareholder must act like a trustee.
Discussion and resolution of this controversy are beyond the scope of this
article. However, in the author's view, the legality of the control premium
has withstood attack in too many cases to claim it is a corporate asset.
Nevertheless, a controlling or dominant shareholder does not have an
unqualified right to sell corporate offices or assets as incidents of control.
Further, a noncontrolling shareholder does not have a right to the control
premium.
According to the black letter law, shareholder fiduciary duty does not
prevent a controlling shareholder from selling a control block of stock for
a premium above market price.'35 However, there are significant exceptions
to the principle that control is freely saleable at a premium, which include:
a controlling shareholder may not sell control under circumstances that
involve the diversion of a corporate opportunity; 13 6 a controlling shareholder
may not sell corporate offices; 3 7 and a controlling shareholder may not sell
138
control to a looter.
These exceptions appear to be in direct contradiction to the principle
that control is freely saleable at a premium. After all, what does the control
premium represent if not the price of a majority of board seats? Further,
why does anyone seek control except for the purpose of managing corporate
assets and taking advantage of corporate perquisites and opportunities? In
these days of junk bond takeovers, where corporate control is purchased at
a premium with borrowed funds which are then repaid through the proceeds
of asset sales, the distinction between the looting and nonlooting cases may
be in the eye of the beholder.
The distinction the courts seem to be making, without directly saying
so, is that a controlling shareholder is entitled to a fair profit on a control
block if the selling controlling shareholder has paid for control by way of
financial investment or value added by astute management of corporate
assets. As stated in Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 39 "... those who
invest the capital necessary to acquire a dominant position in the ownership

135. Claggett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259, 1262-63 (4th Cir. 1978); McDaniel v. Painter,
418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969); Zetline v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 684, 685,
421 N.Y.S.2d 877, 878, 397 N.E.2d 387, 388 (1979). See ALI Tentative Draft No. 10, supra
note 21, at § 5.16.
136. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955); Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 254, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781, 792-93 (1969);
Ferraioli v. Cantor, 281 F. Supp. 354, 356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Commonwealth Title Ins. &
Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 A. 77, 79 (1910).
137. Snyder v. Epstein, 290 F. Supp. 652, 655 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Caplan v. Lionel Corp.,
20 A.D.2d 301, 303, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913, 915, aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 679, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877, 198
N.E.2d 908 (1964); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941). But see Essex
Universal Corp. v. Yales, 305 F.2d 572, 573, 575 (2d Cir. 1962).
138. Insuranshares v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 24-25 (E.D. Pa. 1940);
DeBaun v. First Western Bank & Trust Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 686, 120 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1975);
Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 651 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
139. 48 N.Y.2d 684, 421 N.Y.S.2d 877, 397 N.E.2d 387 (1979).
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of a corporation have the right of controlling that corporation.... The
premium is the added amount an investor is willing to pay for the privilege
of directly influencing the corporation's affairs."' 4
Therefore, someone who has not paid the price for control cannot
retain the control premium, and the arrogation of a corporate opportunity
cannot be disguised as the legitimate sale of a control block.' 4' Further,
although it is lawful to sell control at a premium to a shareholder who
intends to manage the corporation constructively for the benefit of all
shareholders, it is unlawful to sell control to a shareholder who intends to
destroy the corporation or manage it with a view to selectively extracting
profits solely for his own benefit, rather than for the benefit of all
shareholders. 42 A corollary to this principle is found in the greenmail cases
which permit directors to pay greenmail to counter a threat to the corporation.143 It should not necessarily follow that the greenmailer may menace
the corporation and thereby obtain a personal benefit without liability.
The essence of the duty of loyalty the controlling shareholder owes to
minority shareholders is to act for the benefit of the shareholders as a
body, rather than only for his own benefit.'" The ability to sell control at
a premium should properly be viewed as an exception to this general rule,
which permits a controlling shareholder to reap the rewards of responsible
monitoring of management by selling assets thus enhanced in the form of
the power to control the board of directors and the corporation's assets.
In addition, despite the various controversies about takeover tactics, there
is a widespread view that the market for corporate control serves as a
corporate accountability mechanism and makes for the more efficient deployment of corporate assets. 45 Depriving a seller of a control block or the

140. Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 684, 685, 421 N.Y.S.2d 877, 878, 397
N.E.2d 387, 388 (1979).
141. Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 A.D.2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913, aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 679,
249 N.Y.S.2d 877, 198 N.E.2d 908 (1964). One commentator has classified such a transaction
as a sale of management, as opposed to working or absolute control. See Santoni, The

Developing Duties of Controlling Shareholders and Appropriate Restraints on the Sale of
Corporate Control, 4 J. CoiP. L. 285 (1979).
142. See Essex Universal Corp. v. Yales, 305 F.2d 572, 576 (2d Cir. 1962) (stating that
"... a holder of corporate control will not, as a fiduciary, be permitted to profit from
facilitating actions on the part of the purchasers of control which are detrimental to the
interests of the corporation or the remaining shareholders"). See Goode v. Powers, 97 Ariz.
75, 397 P.2d 56, 59-60 (1964). A majority shareholder cannot dissipate, waste, or improperly
dispose of corporate assets. Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 403-04
(Del. Ch. 1969).
143. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
144. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal.
3d 93, 108, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 599, 460 P.2d 464, 471 (1969); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp.,
162 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947).
145. This view runs across a broad political spectrum. See Coffee, Regulating the Market

for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate
Governance, 84 CoLuM. L. Rev. 1145 (1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a

Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HAv. L. REv. 1161, 1169-73,
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control premium would put a damper on this market. It does not necessarily
follow, however, that a greenmailer is entitled to a control premium, which
he has neither paid for nor earned.
3.

Is a Greenmailer a Dominant Shareholder?

Several of the greenmail cases go off on the tack that if the greenmailer
possessed control and sold such control to assist in a management entrenchment scheme, the greenmail would be tortious. However, the greenmailer
was thought not to be a controlling shareholder. Rather, he was someone
who threatened to obtain control. 146 The logic of these cases is faulty,
however, because they permit the greenmailer to receive and retain a portion
of the control premium. The board is permitted to pay the premium over
market that greenmail entails, and such a payment is not considered waste,
47
only because the greenmailer's stake is given the value of a control block.
It does not seem right that the greenmailer wins both ways: he is paid
a control premium, yet he is not saddled with the fiduciary burdens of a
controlling or dominant shareholder. There are two theories, under which
the duty of a controlling shareholder could be imposed upon a greenmailer.
First, it could be argued that the greenmailer impliedly represents that he
has or can readily obtain control, and he therefore undertakes the duty of
a controlling shareholder when he offers to sell his shares to the corporation
at a premium. If he does not really have control to sell, the greenmail
payment is then waste and the greenmailer has defrauded the corporation.
Although the directors may not have been deceived, the corporate entity
may have been defrauded. In either case, the greenmailer should be estopped
from denying he has control.
Second, it could be argued that the justification for imposing a fiduciary
duty on a controlling shareholder applies to greenmailers. In an institutionalized stock market, in addition to the classic cleavage between ownership
and management, there is a separation of savings and investment. 148 Control
in fact therefore can be exercised by a much smaller block of stock than

1182 (1981); Epstein, Who Owns the Corporation (20th Century Fund Paper, Priority Press
Publications 1986); Schwartz, Federal CharteringRevisited, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 7, 12-14

(1988).
146. E.g., Fry v. Trump, 681 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.J. 1988); Heckman v. Ahmanson, 168
Cal. App. 3d 119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985). Under Delaware law only a controlling stockholder
has fiduciary obligations. In re Sea-Land Corp., Civ. Action No. 8453, (Del. Ch. 1987),
reprinted in 13 DEL. J. CoRP. 795, 799 (1987 WL 11283, at 4); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490
A.2d 1050, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff'd, 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990).
147. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-56 (Del. 1964). Companies are given one value
in the market for day-to-day purposes in marginal trading and a higher valuation when control
of whole companies is at stake. The difference between the two values in known as the
premium for control. Plender, Malaise in Need of Long-Term Remedy, Fin. Times, July 20,
1990, at 116, col. 4.
148. Clark, The Four States of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARv. L. REv. 561, 564-65 (1981).
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legally necessary for formal control or stock that was formerly assumed
149
necessary for operating or working control.
The greenmailer's threat is that he is in touch with control and that he
will use this power destructively. In consideration for a greenmail payment
the only value a corporation receives is that the greenmailer either will
refrain from continuing as a shareholder or that he will not effectively
exercise his corporate franchise. He will surrender control to the corporation.
Such a contract implicitly recognizes that the greenmailer is a dominant
shareholder, at least in relation to the threatened contest for corporate
control.
a.

Diversion of a Corporate Opportunity

If the greenmailer has no liability for his conduct he obtains a profit
for a sale of control which he never owned, and he does so in a transaction
that evades the provisions of the Williams Act entitling all shareholders to
fair treatment in tender offers.1 50 Obtaining the greenmail payment for
himself and preventing other shareholders from receiving a tender offer is
seizing an opportunity that should be offered to all shareholders. However,
if a greenmailer is treated as a dominant shareholder with a fiduciary duty
to other shareholders, at the very least greenmail could not be paid in the
absence of a shareholder vote.
If a controlling shareholder can sell a control block at a premium and
such a sale is not ordinarily viewed as taking advantage of a corporate
opportunity, why should the greenmailer be subject to a different duty?
One important difference between a controlling shareholder and a greenmailer is that the greenmailer's investment is minimal in terms of both
capital and time. It is this small financial stake and absence of managerial
responsibility that makes greenmail abusive.
Moreover, in some cases where a buyer of control was willing to offer
a control premium to all shareholders, either by tender offer or merger,
and a majority shareholder usurped this opportunity, the courts have found
a breach of fiduciary duty in the sale of control.' 51 Greenmail similarly cuts
off the opportunity of the majority to receive a tender offer.
b. Sale of Corporate Offices
Even if a controlling shareholder ordinarily can sell control at a premium
and therefore reorganize the board of directors, where a shareholder does
not in fact have control but contracts for the resignation of the board's
directors, the contract is contrary to public policy and void. 52 This is
149. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 63 (1981).

150. See infra notes 199-203.
151. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955);
Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969).
152. Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 A.D.2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913, aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 679,
249 N.Y.S.2d 877, 198 N.E.2d 908 (1964).
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because the management of a corporation is not the subject of trade and
cannot be bought apart from actual stock control.' 53
This principle is perhaps more suitable to greenmail than the corporate
opportunity doctrine because the analogy is factually closer. In a public
corporation control generally is "in a large, fluid, changeable and changing
market."' 154 Directors are in a position to control the corporation, even if
their holdings are minimal, because they have control of the proxy machinery. 5 However, the institutionalization of the market has created the
potential for capital cartels,5 6 where a contest for corporate control can be
57
set off by a shareholder with a small stake.
Where greenmail is paid in this context, (and it usually is), the payment
is made not to initiate a control contest. Whether or not there is any other
proof of management entrenchment, the directors are authorizing the use
of corporate funds to remain in office. 58 While this may be more subtle
than a contract for the sale of corporate office, it is essentially the same
thing. It is a contract to maintain control and should be equally contrary
to public policy, and should result in the return of the greenmail payment
to the corporation. Because control is of no value to the corporation (as
opposed to management), payment for the control premium with corporate
funds is waste.
The Delaware cases distinguishing illegal vote buying from legal greenmail draw a blurred line in order to give directors the benefit of the business
judgment rule,5 9 but the greenmailer needs no such protection. This distinction needs to be made. It should not be necessary to fault directors for
paying greenmail in order to find the greenmail contract voidable as to the
corporation. The directors may defend a greenmail payment under the
theory that the board can respond appropriately to a threat to the corpo-

153. 20 A.D.2d at 303, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 915. See also Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337,
1342 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed sub nom. Lazard Freres & Co. v. Rosenfeld, 409 U.S.
802 (1972).
154. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,280 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
155. See HERAN, supra note 149, at 17-52. This view dates back to BERLE & MEANs,
THE MODERN CoRuoArioN Nt PRIVATE PROPERTY 69-94, 114, 116-18 (1932).
156. See Block & Hoff, Emerging Role of the Institutional Investor, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 12,
1990, at 5, col. 1; Regan, Pension Funds: New Power, New Responsibility, Wall St. J., Nov.
2, 1987, at 28, col. 3; White, Giant Pension Funds' Explosive Growth Concentrates On
Economic Assets and Power, Wall St. J., June 28, 1990, at Cl, col. 3.
157. See HERMAN, supra note 149. The speed with which control can change hands was
exemplified by SCM Corp. v. Hanson Trust PLC, 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985), where the rapid
accumulation of 25% of an issuer's shares, in the wake of a discontinued tender offer, from
a handful of arbitrageurs, was ac'complished within two hours after the close of the market.
All but one of the sellers were subsequently exposed for insider trading in various stocks,
raising questions about the "players" in corporate control markets.
158. Cf. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Place, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
159. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. The logic differentiating these cases
is questionable, but the first Good v. Texaco case was a motion to dismiss and the second
the approval of a settlement.
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ration. Also, issuer repurchases may benefit shareholders by reducing the
number of shares outstanding and thereby increasing book value and earnings per share. However, -just as the corporation can recover the short swing
trading profits of corporate insiders without any need to prove misuse of
inside corporate information, 160 the corporation should be able to recover
the payment of a control premium by the corporation without the need to
prove a management entrenchment scheme. It is the excessive payment over
market price for the property of a single shareholder of no intrinsic value
to the corporation that raises a question of corporate waste. In the same
way that the Exchange Act short swing profit prohibitions are a prophylactic
for the prevention of insider trading, a policy against greenmail would be
a prophylactic against management entrenchment.
It is currently unfashionable to upset corporate decision making on
public policy grounds, nexus of contracts being the trendier corporate
governance model.1 61 Yet, nexus of contracts may be an imperfect model
for changes in corporate control, which involve not only the shift of
economic assets from one group of managers to another, but shifts of
power and income. A recent popular account of the leveraged buy-out of
R.J.R. Nabisco Inc. details the role of ego and personal greed in a highly
publicized corporate control contest.'6 2
One commentator has proposed a very interesting "power model" to
explain recent corporate control shifts which would give a much larger role
to the judiciary in monitoring management conduct.6 3 Under the power
model, a corporation is not a marketplace, "but an organic institution with
its own internal structure and processes that impact on control of the firm."
Management "holds a strategic position in the firm that it utilizes to
minimize the influence of other constituencies."' 64 A significant implication
of such a model is that "fiduciary duties of directors become a matter for
public policy determination rather than a decision to be made by share65
holders on a company-by-company basis."'
Even under a contractarian approach to corporate law, it should be
stressed that in the negotiation between corporate directors and a greenmailer, all other shareholders are not consulted and they generally lose
out. 66 The purchase of the right to remain in office by an incumbent board
that greenmail entails, if not set aside on public policy grounds, should at
least be put to a shareholder vote.
160. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972); Blau v. Lehman,
368 U.S. 403, 411-12 (1962). Admittedly, this result was accomplished by statute.
161. Clark, Contracts, Elites and Traditions in the Making of CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM.
L. REv. 1703 (1989). See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
162. BURROUGH & HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE (1990). See also Chock Full O'Nuts
Corp. v. Finkelstein, 548 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
163. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 19 (1988).
164. Id. at 25.
165. Id. at 115.
166. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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c.

Looting

Superficially, the cases which hold that a controlling shareholder may
not knowingly sell control to a looter have little to do with greenmail. Yet,
further analysis reveals a principle underlying the looting cases which may
be relevant.
In the case of Insuranceshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp. 67 the
Court enunciated the basic rationale for shareholder duties as follows:
Those who control a corporation, either through majority stock
ownership, ownership of large blocks of stock less than a majority,
officeholding, management contracts, or otherwise, owe some duty
to the corporation in respect of the transfer of the control to
outsiders. The law has long ago reached the point where it is
recognized that such persons may not be wholly oblivious of the
interests of everyone but themselves, even in the act of parting with
control, and that, under certain circumstances, they may be held
liable for whatever injury to the corporation made possible by the
transfer. Without attempting any general definition, and stating the
duty in minimum terms as applicable to the facts of this case, it
may be said that the owners of control are under a duty not to
transfer it to outsiders if the circumstances surrounding the proposed
transfer are such as to awaken suspicion and put a prudent man
on his guard-unless a reasonably adequate investigation discloses
such facts as would convince a reasonable person that no fraud is
168
intended or likely to result.
This language suggests that those who have power to affect the existence
of a corporation or the value of the shares held by all other shareholders
cannot use their power destructively or aid and abet another party who
intends to damage the corporation.
The looting cases turn on the question of whether the seller of control
has reason to know (generally, because of a highly inflated price paid for
his shares) that the buyer intends to take corporate assets for his personal
use. Similarly, a recent note on greenmail has suggested that the liability
of a greenmailer for aiding and abetting a directorial breach of fiduciary
duty should depend on the greenmailer's knowledge of that breach of
duty. 169 While this analysis goes only so far as to make the greenmailer an
aider and abetter, perhaps it can be pushed further. If a greenmailer has
been aligned with a pool of buyers of control and his threat is to put a
corporation in play, under circumstances that would harm the shareholders
as a whole, he would appear to be guilty of coercive action, which is an

167. 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
168. Insuranceshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp. 35 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
169. Note, Aiding and Abetting the Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Will the Greenmailer Be
Held Liable?, 39 CAsE W. Ras. L. REv. 1271, 1294-1302, 1311-12 (1988-89).
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independent wrong, and would not be liable merely as a participant in an
70
improper scheme by directors.'
The Delaware cases view greenmail as a threat to the corporation to
which directors can properly respond by paying greenmail.' 7 1 However, they
do not take the next step and make a greenmailer's conduct unlawful. While
a greenmailer's liability, like all fiduciary duty cases, would have to depend
on the facts and circumstances surrounding the payment, courts should at
least consider whether the greenmailer has wielded a power to make him a
dominant shareholder in the context of a contest for corporate control, and
then, whether that power has been abused to the corporation's detriment.
B.

CorporateBlackmailers

Greenmail has been likened to blackmail or extortion, and indeed it is
remarkably similar.172 One theorist has argued that the essence of blackmail
"is the misuse of an informal (or formal) power or agency or representation.' ' 73 This is precisely what the greenmailer does. Greenmailers usurp
the power to elect a majority of the board, a power that they have neither
earned nor purchased, and that lawfully resides with other shareholders of
the corporation. The leverage they use to coerce a premium repurchase from
the corporation is that they will instigate others to take over the corporation.
Greenmailers thrive on their terrible reputations. They are able to coerce
boards into buying their shares at a premium (and this conduct is countenanced by the courts), because they are threats to corporate stability. This
type of conduct is very similar to noninformational blackmail; for example,
the threat by a labor leader to initiate a strike unless he is paid off. 74 In
such a situation the blackmailer "is negotiating for his own gain with
'7 5
someone else's leverage or bargaining chips."'

170. The extent to which players in the takeover battles of the 1980s worked in concert
is unclear, but there is some evidence of investor groups in certain transactions. See Frankel,
Drexel's Shakedown?, AzmRItcAN LAW., July/August 1990 at 40; Meyers, How Magnates Pick
Partners, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1988, § 6 Business World Magazine, pt. 2, at 26, col. 1.
171. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. For a general definition of economic
duress or business compulsion, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (1981). Among
other things, "A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and ...
what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends." Id. at § 176(2)(c). For
cases on economic duress or business compulsion as a basis for rescinding contracts, see S.
WILLISTON,

WILLISTON

ON CONTRACTS §

1618 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1970).

173. Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. Ry. 670, 703 (1984).
See also Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. Cm. L. Rv. 553, 565-66 (1983), (arguing that
blackmail breeds fraud and deceit; it is sneaky and dirty). The tort of duress has been compared
to fraud. Note, Duress as a Tort, 39 HARv. L. Rv. 108 (1925).
174. United States v. Kramer, 355 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.), vacated in part and remanded,
384 U.S. 100 (1966); United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 947 (1964). Cf. United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 133-36 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
175. Lindgren, supra note 173, at 702.
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Extortion is made unlawful under federal law by the Hobbs Act, which
prohibits "the obtaining of property from another, without his consent,
induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear, or
under color of official right."' 176 In Viacom InternationalInc. v. Icahn17 a
suit was brought by a corporation which had paid greenmail to Carl C.
Icahn and various corporations controlled by him (the "Icahn Group"),
which had acquired almost 17% of its common stock. For purposes of a
summary judgment motion, it was conceded that the greenmail payment
had a value of $79.50 per share at a time when the actual market value of
a share of common stock was $62, representing a premium over market of
$60,525,000. The complaint alleged violations of the Hobbs Act as predicate
acts for a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of RICO and the
fraudulent sale of securities. The Court held that a jury could find that the
corporation had a reasonable fear of harm to existing or potential economic
opportunities as long as the Icahn Group owned such a large block of its
shares and were in a position to threaten a takeover.
According to the Court, greenmail is not inherently unlawful, but it
could constitute a wrongful means of obtaining property under the Hobbs
Act if the Icahn Group had no lawful claim to the property obtained. The
court examined two such scenarios. One is where the victim receives in
exchange for his property something that is of no value to the victim; for
example, where a union uses fear to induce an employer to pay wages for
an additional worker to do exactly what another worker was being paid to
do. A second scenario is where the victim receives something that the victim
values. In this category, however, some acts constitute extortion while others
are found to be hard bargaining.
Analyzing the first type of extortion, the Court found that the Icahn
Group provided the plaintiff corporation with a standstill agreement and
shares of stock in return for the consideration received. This analysis,
however, does not go far enough. The premium of over $60 million paid
to the Icahn Group was a control premium. Yet, control is of no value to
the corporation. Further, Icahn did not have control, but only threatened
to obtain it. As to the second type of extortion, the Court found the
corporation had no right to be free from the problems and fears of a
takeover threat and therefore any intentional exploitation of this fear by
the Icahn Group was only hard bargaining in a deal which resulted in
plaintiff receiving an eleven year standstill agreement, a benefit to which it
was not otherwise entitled by law. Because the Hobbs Act claim failed, so
did the RICO claim.
Viacom is the first case that seriously comes to grips with the claim
that greenmail is extortion. It failed to find a Hobbs Act violation primarily
because the court accepted the contract between the corporation and the
Icahn Group at face value and did not distinguish between the value of the

176. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1988).
177. 747 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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agreement to the corporation's officers and directors and its value to the
corporation and its shareholders. The court perhaps was affected by the
complicity of management in the greenmail payment and the business
judgment rule cases validating greenmail contracts. An analogy to the cases
holding that a corporation can be deceived even if its directors are not,
because they are participants in a fraud on the corporation, might be
helpful. Although control, or whatever portion of the control premium $60
million represented, may have been of value to management, it was paid
for with corporate funds and was of no value to the corporation. Therefore,
the real victim of the greenmail payment did not receive anything of value,
and the plaintiff should have been permitted to pursue Hobbs Act allegations.
In any event, greenmail could fit into the state law tort of economic
or business duress. In one case, a claim under New York law for economic
duress against a greenmailer was made, which the court dismissed on the
ground that it was not duress to threaten a tender offer, because a tender
offer was a legally permissible action. 7 8 Although New York law may
support such an analysis, 79 under the law of other jurisdictions tortious
duress may be accomplished through lawful means, if those means are used
to trade upon the victim's financial position with the improper purpose of
securing personal advantage. 80 Acts that are wrongful in a moral sense, if
made use of as a means of causing fear, vitiate a transaction induced by
that fear, though the acts may not in themselves be legal wrongs. 8'
In Neibuhr v. Gage 82 the plaintiff sued for damages for duress in the
transfer of shares of stock to the defendant. The plaintiff claimed that the
defendant had falsely accused him of grand larceny and threatened to expose
him. The plaintiff believed that the defendant would produce false testimony
to this effect and therefore he entered into a contract for the stock transfer.
The court struggled with the novelty of the allegations and concluded that
duress and fraud should be treated as equivalent grounds for invalidating
a contract for the transfer of stock.
[I]s a party who has been injured by duress entitled to the same
remedies as one who has been injured by deception? We are unable
to see why there should be any distinction made between these two
classes of cases. Fraud is ordinarily accomplished by deceit, but it
is also accomplished by many other practices. As commonly under-

178. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
179. Hammelburger v. Foursome Inn Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 580, 593 n.4, 431 N.E.2d 278,
285 n.4, 446 N.Y.S.2d 917, 924 n.4 (1981). But see National American Corp. v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.
1979).
180. Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 57 N.J. Super. 278, 287, 154 A.2d 625, 630 (App. Div.
1959); Fowler v. Mumford, 48 Del. 282, 286-87, 102 A.2d 535, 537-38 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954);
Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 204 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1984).
181. Miller v. Eisele, 111 N.J.L. 268, 275-76, 168 A. 426, 429-30 (1933).
182. 99 Minn. 149, 108 N.W. 884, aff'd on rehearing, 109 N.W. 1 (1906) (per curiam).
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stood, fraud is a wrong accomplished by deception but ... duress
is a species of fraud in which compulsion in some form takes the
1 83
place of deception in accomplishing the injury.
C. Stock Manipulators
Greenmail seems to skirt various antifraud provisions of the Exchange
Act. Although affirmative misrepresentations by greenmailers have on occasion been found actionable under the antifraud rules of the Exchange
Act,' 8 4 the act of greenmail itself is difficult to place within the restrictions
that the Supreme Court has imposed upon the antifraud provisions in recent
years. The principles that securities fraud cases require manipulation or
deception, 8 5 that the plaintiff be a buyer or seller of stock,' 8 6 and that the
defendant in an omission case be guilty of a breach of duty, beyond a
generalized duty to the marketplace, 87 pose serious barriers to a case by
shareholders that they were defrauded by a greenmailer.'8 8 Further, it is
difficult for the corporation to claim it was deceived. 1 9
Nevertheless, there are several theories under which greenmail could be
deemed to violate the Exchange Act. These include the argument that
greenmail is a manipulative or deceptive device under Rule lOb-5'19 or Rule
14e-3,' 9' and that greenmail is a manipulation under Section 9(a) 92 of the
Exchange Act. While these theories could be implemented by judicial
decisions, the SEC also could outlaw greenmail by rule-making under Section
13(e)' 93 of the Exchange Act and other pertinent provisions.
In Shreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.194 the Supreme Court held that
an antitakeover corporate action was not a manipulative or deceptive device
under the Williams Act. The Court suggested that in order for conduct to
be actionable under Rule 10b-5 or Rule 14e-3, there must be nondisclosure
or deception. One commentator has argued that the rationale of the Shreiber

183. Neibuhr v. Gage, 99 Minn. 149, 156, 108 N.W. 884, 887, aff'd on reh'g, 109 N.W.
1 (1906) (per curiam).
184. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
185. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
186. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Christophides v.
Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Before the corporation purchases the greenmailer's
stock, this doctrine is a serious barrier to the corporation's standing or the standing of a
nonselling shareholder as a plaintiff. See Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 284-85 (4th
Cir. 1983). After the greenmail purchase, however, the corporation would have standing. A
nonselling shareholder might still have a standing problem.
187. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
188. See supra notes 119, 123-24 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
190. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
191. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1990).
192. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1988).
193. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1988).
194. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
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case stands in the way of holding that greenmail is a manipulative device
under the Exchange Act, because greenmail is coercive rather than fraudulent. 195 Under this analysis, manipulative conduct must contain an element
of deception in order to violate the Exchange Act.
Although the SEC and the courts have emphasized the full disclosure
underpinnings of the Exchange Act, particularly in Rule lOb-5 cases, the
Congress that passed the Exchange Act in 1934 was concerned primarily
with regulating speculation and manipulation. The legislative history supporting such a conclusion is comprehensively laid out in a recent law review
article, which explains that Congress debated whether absolutely to outlaw
certain conduct perceived as contrary to the public interest such as short
selling, securities credit transactions and collusive trading, all of which
generated speculation in the stock market. 96 Instead, Congress gave the
SEC the authority to regulate such activities. Furthermore, Congress believed
that manipulation was not limited to deceptive stock market activities.
Rather, the concept of manipulation included pool activities which involved
concerted trading power that caused price changes, thereby enabling pool
operators to sell securities they had purchased at a profit.97
Viewed from this perspective, greenmail can be analyzed as a manipulative device or contrivance. When a greenmailer purchases his toe-hold
position, the share price of the targeted issuer generally rises and then falls
after the greenmailer is paid off. 9 ' The market rises because these purchases
signal a takeover, 99 but the greenmailer does not intend or accomplish a
takeover. In this sense greenmail does contain an element of deception in
addition to its coercive qualities.
In addition to the provisions of Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3 prohibiting
deceptive or manipulative devices, there are specific Exchange Act provisions
in Section 9(a) of the Exchange Act barring stock market manipulations.
These provisions generally were directed at the pool operators of the 1920s.
It could be argued that greenmail violates Section 9(a) of the Exchange Act
because it is manipulative in the sense that it is "a series of transactions
... creating actual or apparent active trading in such security or raising
...the price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase
... of such security by others." 20° Furthermore, if these purchases are
accompanied by any false statements about the greenmailer's intentions
(generally, "I am not a greenmailer" protestations), there is authority for

195. Poser, Stock Market Manipulation and CorporateControl Transactions,40 U.
L. REv. 671, 719-21 (1986).

MIAMI

196. Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L.

REV.

385 (1990).

197. Id.at 451.
198. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
199. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). See also SLATER, THE TrrANs OF
TAKEOVER 17 (1987); supra note 26 and accompanying text.
200. Exchange Act, § 9(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1988). Cf. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse
Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
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considering the trading a violation of the antimanipulative provisions of the
Exchange Act. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Wolfson20° involved
a public announcement by Louis Wolfson, a well known stock speculator,
that he intended to sell a large position of American Motors Corp. stock.
In fact, he had a large short position in this stock, which had been steadily
rising in price. The SEC charged that his misstatement violated Section
9(a)(4) of the Exchange Act and an injunction on consent was issued. 20 2
The securities laws recognize that purchases by an issuer of its own
stock have a special potential for manipulation. Sections 3(e)(1) and (2) of
the Exchange Act 2° 3 give the SEC authority to regulate issuer repurchases.
Pursuant to this authority, the SEC has adopted Rule 10b-18, 204 which
specifies certain time, price, and other parameters for issuer repurchases.
The object of this regulation is to prevent the issuer repurchases from
artificially raising the price of the issuer's shares. Greenmail presents the
opposite problem. Greenmail can artificially depress the price of the issuer's
205
shares. Additionally, issuer tender offers are regulated under Rule 13e-3.
If the corporation repurchasing a greenmailer's shares were required to
make a tender offer to do so, all shareholders would have the opportunity
to share in the premium the greenmailer obtains.2 Presumably, the SEC
could extend this rule to greenmail by requiring an issuer paying greenmail
to tender to all shareholders, but it has not chosen to do So.207 In order to
go further and subject the greenmailer to liability the SEC would have to
find a way to impose a duty to other stockholders on the greenmailer.
There are a number of provisions under the Exchange Act that impose
a duty to other shareholders or buyers or sellers of stock upon shareholders.
Generally, such shareholders are "insiders" or large shareholders. The term
"insider" is not defined in the federal securities laws, but in 1934 Congress
took the view that 10% holders should be treated as insiders for certain
purposes and not allowed to speculate in an issuer's securities. 208 More

201. SEC Lit. Rel. No. 1315 (Aug. 1, 1958).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4) (1988). Section 9 applies to exchange listed securities, but
trading in an over-the-counter stock that would be manipulative under Section 9 is deemed to
be fraudulent under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. SEC v. Allison, [1981-82 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,427 at 92,550 n.7 (D. Ore. 1982).
203. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(1), (2) (1988).
204. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18 (1990).
205. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1990). A fully disclosed issuer tender offer does not violate
the Exchange Act, even if it involves a breach of fiduciary duty. Vaughn v. Teledyne, 628
F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1980).
206. This result is required by SEC Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1990).
207. Despite doubts about the SEC's authority to adopt a rule requiring a tender offeror
to give all shareholders the best price of any offer, Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-10 (1990),
was upheld by the Third Circuit in Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 995 (3d Cir.

1988).
208. Under Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988), a 10%
shareholder must account to a corporation and repay profits made on trading its equity
securities within a six-month period. See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951) (giving policy justification for treating 10% holders as insiders).
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recently, 5% holders have been required to disclose their purchases to other
shareholders, as well as their investment intentions and sources of securities
209
credit.
Greenmail can be analogized to insider trading, which is tortious conduct
by one shareholder against the remaining shareholders. Both are destructive
of investor confidence in the fairness of the markets. In an early case, the
SEC justified the prohibition against trading on inside information on two
grounds:
[FJirst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and
second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
210
whom he is dealing.
Trading on inside information destroys the integrity of the market place
21
by giving informational advantage to a select group of corporate insiders.
A greenmailer is not a corporate insider in the sense that he is an officer
or director of the issuer whose shares he is trading. However, the greenmailer
receives favored treatment as a result of his possession of a strategic block
and a special relationship with potential bidders.
Insider trading violates Rule lOb-5 under the Exchange Act, which
makes it unlawful for any person in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security, among other things "to engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person. ' '212 Similarly, Rule 14e-3 defines insider trading relating to a tender
offer by any person as a "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or
practice. ' 213 If, as previously argued, 2 4 coercion can be considered as a
species of fraud, greenmail could be encompassed within the literal language
of Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3.
Facially, Rule 14e-3, unlike Rule lOb-5 as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, 2 5 does not require that the insider trader breach a fiduciary relationship or confidential duty. For this reason, in a 2-1 decision, the Second
Circuit expressed doubt as to the validity of Rule 14e-3.216 The author

209. Under Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988), a 5% holder
must file disclosure statements pursuant to the Williams Act. Some claim greenmailers intentionally limit their holdings to less than 5% to avoid disclosure. See Nussbaum, The Greenmailers Learn to Play in the Shadows, Bus. WK., May 5, 1986, at 105.
210. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914 (1961) (footnote omitted).
211. 2 T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SEcusiTus REGULATON 137-38 (2d ed. 1990).
212. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (1990).
213. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1990).
214. See supra notes 172-83 and accompanying text.
215. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
216. United States v. Chestman, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,214 at 95,906, 95,908 (2d Cir. May 2, 1990), rehearing en banc granted, [Current Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,439.
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believes such an interpretation of Rule 14e-3 is erroneous and that any
person with the requisite intent in the possession of inside information
relating to a tender offer should be subject to a duty to disclose that
information or abstain from trading. 217 If it is necessary to spell out a duty
would be
to impose liability on a greenmailer, then the analysis required
218
similar to that required under state corporation law doctrines.
To put an activity like greenmail in the straight jacket of state law
fiduciary duty concepts, however, seems contrary to the intent of Congress
in enacting the Exchange Act to supplement common law investor protections.219 Manipulation is essentially an interference with fully informed
trading in the public markets. Greenmail is manipulative because it plays a
trick on reasonable shareholder expectations by driving up share prices to
reflect a phony control premium and then, adding insult to injury, coercively
extracting such an increase in share price from the corporation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

From a certain perspective, the search in this article for theories of
liability for greenmail has been a futile exercise. Despite consistent criticisms
of greenmail, the SEC has declined to urge its abolition or bring cases to
stop it, Congress has not legislated against it, and the Delaware courts have
turned a blind eye to its evils. Furthermore, the excesses of the takeover
frenzy of the past decade appear to be subsiding, and greenmail is now
discouraged by the tax laws. Although the California and some federal
courts have held greenmailers liable as aiders and abetters of directorial
wrongdoing, no court has held that greenmail is an independent tort.
Yet, in view of the institutionalization of the securities markets and the
widespread suspicion and criticism of investor behavior, 20 it is important
to consider what types of conduct by large investors might be a breach of
duty to other investors. Greenmail cries out for analysis as a tort. While it
could be banned or conditioned upon a shareholder vote by statute or SEC
rule, a case by case analysis might be more flexible in distinguishing between
egregious block sales to a corporation of its own stock and situations where
there is a justification for the premium sale.
This article has suggested that the greenmailer can breach a duty to the
corporation and other shareholders because he possesses or purports to
possess shares commanding a control premium. Accordingly, he has assumed
a duty to the corporation and other shareholders with respect to the sale
of his block. Furthermore, his conduct is a type of coercion that should be

217. Karmel, Limitations on SEC Rule-Making, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16, 1990, at 6, col. 1.
218. See supra notes 146-71 and accompanying text.
219. Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEo. L.J. 1083, 1109, 1134 (1985).
220. See Lipton, supra note 23, at 32; Punters or Proprietors?(Survey), ECONOMIST, May
5, 1990, at 64. See generally Our Money's Worth, The Report of the Governor's Task Force
on Pension Fund Investment (June 1989).
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classified as economic duress or a similar tort. These theories sound primarily
under state law, but in appropriate fact situations could involve violations
of the federal securities law or other federal statutes. In addition, the trading
activities of a greenmailer should be regarded as a fraudulent or manipulative
device or contrivance in violation of the federal securities laws. When the
financial history of the 1980s is fully revealed, greenmailers could well be
seen as the lookouts for the takeover pools that engulfed American enterprise. Yet, greenmailers were loyal neither to the corporations whose stock
they purchased nor the bidders they purported to represent, but served only
their own opportunistic ends.

